The emergence of the campaign to open up the West: ideological formation, central decision-making, and the role of the provinces by Holbig, Heike
www.ssoar.info
The emergence of the campaign to open up the
West: ideological formation, central decision-
making, and the role of the provinces
Holbig, Heike
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Dieser Beitrag ist mit Zustimmung des Rechteinhabers aufgrund einer (DFG geförderten) Allianz- bzw. Nationallizenz
frei zugänglich. / This publication is with permission of the rights owner freely accessible due to an Alliance licence and
a national licence (funded by the DFG, German Research Foundation) respectively.
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Holbig, H. (2004). The emergence of the campaign to open up the West: ideological formation, central
decision-making, and the role of the provinces. The China Quarterly, 178, 335-357. https://doi.org/10.1017/
S0305741004000207
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-368837
The Emergence of the Campaign to Open Up
the West: Ideological Formation, Central
Decision-making and the Role of the
Provinces
Heike Holbig
ABSTRACT This article examines the formation of the Open Up the West policy
from the 1980s to the present. Focusing on the dynamic interaction between central
party-state and provincial-level players, it analyses the various ideological and
pragmatic factors that have shaped the policy over time. The campaign to Open Up
the West is decribed as a “soft policy” to highlight a very diffuse decision-making
process which has produced a highly diverse set of agendas and instruments. Due to
the amorphous nature of the policy, the article finds, its realization depends to a great
extent on the specific interpretations and arrangements of the provincial jurisdictions
involved.
In June 1999 in the ancient city of Xi’an, Comrade Jiang Zemin made the appeal to
the whole party and the people of the whole country on the great development of the
western region. Three years have gone by, and the roads have become passable, the
lights have become lit, the mountains have become green, the rivers have become
clear and the travelling traders have become abundant. One after another, wonderful
stories about the homeland of the western region have been circulated and sung.1
The policy of “Opening Up the West” was propagated after mid-1999 as
a brainchild of the retiring third-generation leader Jiang Zemin. Presented
as a clearly delineated strategy of socio-economic development of the
country’s interior regions to narrow the gap with the prosperous coastal
areas, the policy seems to get less tangible the closer one looks. Many
different factors shaped its formulation, making it hard to establish a clear
causality between them. Agendas proliferate and priorities shift over
time, producing a diverse array of goals and measures. In the course of
the policy’s implementation, its geographic boundaries have moved, and
the actors at central and regional levels have changed.
To cope with the inherent lack of clarity this article aims at tracing
back the diffuse decision-making process behind the Open Up the West
policy, focusing on the dynamic interaction of central and provincial-
level players. It will look at its ideological formation as well as the
academic discourse and other factors shaping the policy since the 1980s.
It will also try to identify the main agendas promoted since 1999 in an
ongoing bargaining process between competing departmental and re-
gional interests. Based on the limited evidence available, it is argued that
the Open Up the West policy is best described as “soft” – an amorphous
1. Xinhua News Agency, 12 November 2002, English translation in BBC Asia Pacific
Economic File, 14 November 2002.
 The China Quarterly, 2004
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set of diverse policy agendas and instruments not designed to form a
complete and coherent programme, but rather to appeal to as many
interests as possible simultaneously. As a consequence of this “soft”
nature, policy implementation is found to depend to a great extent on the
specific interpretations and arrangements of the provincial jurisdictions
involved. With a planning horizon of several decades, it is too early to
assess the overall impact and viability of the policy. However, its future
realization can be expected to become increasingly constrained by the
limitations of central funding over the years to come.
The Formation of Ideology – Deng Xiaoping’s Promise
China’s vast hinterland seems to have preoccupied all Chinese leaders
in the 20th century, though with varying agendas. Sun Yat-sen, in 1922,
published The International Development of China2 where he tried to
attract the post-war foreign powers to invest in the country’s western
regions in order eventually to create the huge Chinese market they had
been thirsting for. In the 1960s, Mao Zedong formulated the “Third
Front” strategy which started out as a programme for economic and social
development of China’s interior provinces but was then redesigned as a
strategy for national defence.3 Not surprisingly, the programmatic roots of
the Open Up the West policy go back much further than Jiang Zemin’s
1999 appeal. Deng Xiaoping had already reasoned about regional devel-
opment in China in the latter half of the 1980s. Obviously with the aim
of justifying his uneven policy of coastal development, he formulated a
strategy of “two overall situations” with two stages of regional develop-
ment. The coastal areas were first to be given central support; once they
had reached a sufficient level of development, the interior areas in turn
would receive such support. Within this logic of regionally alternating
privilege and subordination, Deng made it clear that the central govern-
ment had to play a focal role as the only agency to safeguard a
co-ordinated development of the whole country.4
Pressure from various provincial jurisdictions in China’s interior might
have been a factor shaping Deng Xiaoping’s two stages strategy. Provin-
cial administrators and scholars from Sichuan, Yunnan and Guizhou
formed the “Research forum for the strategy to Open Up the South-west”
in the mid-1980s because of the disadvantages felt by the interior regions
through the centre’s priority of coastal development. This informal
2. Sun Yat-sen, The International Development of China (New York & London: G. P.
Putnam’s Sons, 1922).
3. Shu Keng, “ ‘San xian’ jianshe shimo: dalu xibu da kaifa de qianqu” (“ ‘Go west’ in
the 1960s: returning to the Third-Front experience”), Zhongguo dalu yanjiu (Mainland China
Studies), Vol. 44, No. 12 (December 2001), pp. 1–19; Barry Naughton, “The Third Front:
dense industrialization in the Chinese interior,” The China Quarterly, No. 115 (September
1988).
4. Tian Xiaowen, “Deng Xiaoping’s nanxun: impact on China’s regional development,”
in John Wong and Zheng Yongnian (eds.), The Nanxun Legacy and China’s Development in
the Post-Deng Era (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2001), ch. 5, pp. 75–92 at
pp. 78–79; Renmin ribao (People’s Daily), 18 March 2000.
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alliance, later joined by Tibet and Guangxi, tried to strengthen inter-
provincial commercial links in the interior to make good the lack of
access to foreign investment. At the same time, it lobbied the central
government to shift its priorities of regional development and to recog-
nize the economic, social and political importance of the south-west with
its rich resources and ethnic diversity.5 A similar campaign to “Open Up
the North-west” with Xinjiang as a self-acclaimed model of development,
was pushed after the early 1990s by provincial jurisdictions in the
north-west, though with less cohesiveness and impact.6
In 1992 when Deng Xiaoping made his famous “inspection” tour of
south-east China to reconfirm the policy of economic reform and external
openness, he reiterated the two stages strategy of regional development in
more detail. Hoping to preserve the patience and compliance of the
interior while granting more favours to the coastal areas, for the first time,
though rather tentatively, he added a timetable:
If the rich become richer and the poor become poorer, there would occur polarization
that is exactly what a socialist system should and can avoid. One of the solutions to
the problem is that the areas that become prosperous first pay more profits and taxes
to help the development of poor areas. It is, of course, no good if this is to be done
soon. … It can be assumed, however, that we should give prominence to the issue
when we attain a moderately high standard of living at the end of the century. At that
time, developed areas will continue to develop, and help underdeveloped areas
vigorously by various means, e.g. paying more profits and taxes and transferring
technology. … In sum, as far as the whole nation is concerned, we will definitely
resolve the problem of disparities between the rich coast and poor interior gradually
and smoothly.7
Here, in the ideological calendar of Chinese socialism, the turn of the
century was authoritatively marked as the magical turning point for the
central government to compensate the interior areas for the long years of
subordination. The future development of the inland regions was pro-
jected as part and parcel of the CCP’s strategy to build a “well-off
society” over the whole of China by the middle of the 21st century.
Owing to the ongoing lobbying of western and central regional leaders at
national Party congresses, national people’s congresses and work confer-
ences over the following years, there was a first formal shift of policy in
September 1995 at the 14th Central Committee’s fifth plenary session.
Under the new formula of “co-ordinated development among different
regions” the regional development strategy was adjusted to show con-
sideration for the hinterland.8 The leverage of western representatives,
5. See Hong Lijian’s contribution to this volume; Hong Lijian, “Sichuan: disadvantage
and mismanagement in the Heavenly Kingdom,” in David S. G. Goodman (ed.), China’s
Provinces in Reform. Class, Community and Political Culture (London & New York:
Routledge, 1997), pp. 199–236.
6. See Nicolas Bequelin’s contribution to this volume.
7. Cited from Tian Xiaowem, “Deng Xiaoping’s nanxun,” pp. 83–84.
8. Hu Angang, Wang Shaoguang and Kang Xiaoguang, Zhongguo diqu chaju baogao
(Report on China’s Regional Disparity) (Liaoyang: Liaoning renmin chubanshe, 1995),
p. 100; Yehua Dennis Wei, Regional Development in China. State, Globalization, and
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however, seems to have been limited (none of them, for example, was
sitting on the Politburo), and politics, with its focus on the coastal
provinces, does not seem to have changed very much. Yet, with the turn
of the century drawing closer – and pressures from other sides mounting
– the promise Deng Xiaoping had given to the interior regions was passed
on to his successor Jiang Zemin, who eventually had to honour it.
Academic Input – the Mission of Social Equality and National Integration
Deng Xiaoping’s general support for phased regional development in
the 1980s meant that it was now possible for academics to contribute their
theoretical concepts. Economists, geographers and sociologists offered a
broad range of theories which were selected and fed into the policy-mak-
ing process according to the preferences of particular regional representa-
tives, ministries or political leaders. As is still the case today, academic
debate involving individual scholars and think tanks seems to have been
very much structured by the policy preferences of central leaders and
leadership organs.
The long and multifaceted debate on regional development basically
divided into two main arguments. On the one hand, there were scholars
who talked about a “ladder-step theory” and on the other were those who
opposed it. The “ladder-step theory,” sometimes rendered in English as
“echelon theory” and better known as “trickle-down theory,” holds that
China, as a large developing country, should concentrate its scarce
resources in the coastal areas which, owing to comparative advantages in
factor endowments, are suited best to move quickly up the ladder of
technological and economic progress. New technologies first imported by
the coastal regions will gradually diffuse into the hinterland and thus,
ladder-step by ladder-step, stimulate the development of the interior
regions. This theory predicts that the disparity between coastal and
interior areas will be reduced with the gradual alignment of growth rates
in different regions.9 Obviously, this theory in its Chinese version con-
formed very well with Deng Xiaoping’s strategy of uneven regional
development, explicitly justifying why coastal areas should be allowed to
“get rich first.”
While ladder-step theory controlled the academic mainstream in the
1980s, it provoked a series of counter-theories. Interestingly, as a retro-
spective of academic discussion of regional development published in
2000 states, it was theorists from western China who increasingly chal-
footnote continued
Inequality (London & New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 23; Tian Xiaowen, “Deng Xiaoping’s
nanxun,” p. 86.
9. Wei, Regional Development in China, pp. 1–23 passim; Gao Zhengang et al., Xibu da
kaifa zhi lu (The Path Towards Opening Up the West) (Beijing: Jingji kexue chubanshe, 2000),
pp. 48–51; Shu Keng, “Zhongguo dalu dong xi bu fazhan bu pingheng de qiyuan: guojia,
shichang, quyu kaifa” (“Tracing the origin of regional disparity in China: state, market and
regional development”), Zhongguo dalu yanjiu (Mainland China Studies), Vol. 45, No. 3
(May/June 2002), pp. 27–57, esp. pp. 34–36.
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lenged the mainstream theorists. In their “anti-ladder-step theory” they
argued that the former was misconceived in its application to Chinese
territory because the alleged regional differences in fact were mainly
based on disparities created by the conditions of maritime trade which
naturally favoured the coastal areas. There was no justification, however,
to translate this commercially created disparity directly into a regional
hierarchy of technologically developed, less developed, and underdevel-
oped regions as ladder-step theory presupposed. In reality, the western
regions were rich in natural resources, and parts could even be grouped
among the technologically most highly developed regions in the country.
Anti-ladder-step-theorists argued further that the ladder-step-theory
was not only misconceived from a theoretical point of view, but that it
implied a systematic discrimination against the western regions. By
recommending a channelling of advanced technologies to the coastal
areas, the economically backward regions were denied their chance for
development and thus condemned to remain backward forever. To re-
verse this discriminatory policy, they proposed that no matter which
technological stage a region had reached, if it was in need of economic
development and had the necessary preconditions to develop, it should
not be refused the most advanced technologies to support its develop-
ment. Political perception of the problem seems to have intensified during
the first half of the 1990s, when social scientists presented statistical data
showing that the growth generated in the coastal areas had indeed failed
to diffuse into the hinterland and that the expected “trickle-down” effect
was not materializing. Instead, as the statistics demonstrated, the regional
gap between coastal and interior areas had widened significantly, causing
an increasing disparity of growth rates, incomes and social development
between eastern and western China.10
Among the many academic voices, Hu Angang, director of the
influential Research Institute on National Conditions, seems to have been
most instrumental in creating a favourable intellectual environment for
and in shaping the political discourse of the campaign to Open Up the
West. His role as public intellectual behind various policy initiatives in
the latter half of the 1990s cannot be divorced from his outstanding
position in Beijing’s academic landscape and his special access to central
policy-makers, which, according to hearsay, results from his family’s
personal connections to Zhu Rongji and other leaders.11
Starting in the early 1990s, Hu Angang authored or co-authored a
series of reports and books on China’s regional disparity, some of them
written in English and based on theories and methods from Western
social sciences, a fact that must have lent them special credibility in the
10. Gao Zhengang et al., The Path Towards Opening Up the West.
11. Duan Silin, “Zhongguo xibu da kaifa” (“The great development of China’s west”),
Guangjiaojing (Wide Angle), Hong Kong, January 2000, pp. 6–9; Barry Naughton, “China’s
economic think tanks: their changing role in the 1990s,” The China Quarterly, No. 171
(September 2002), pp. 625–635; Laurent Malvezin, “Interview with Hu Angang: on China
reforms and the go-west policy,” www.asian-affairs.com/China/huangang.html, visited 2
January 2003.
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eyes of Chinese readers.12 In his publications, Hu portrayed a growing
economic gap between eastern and western China which he found too
excessively large to be allowed to grow further. While the relative
disparity in per capita GDP between the coastal and the interior regions
was found to have narrowed during the years 1978–90, regional disparity
was again on the rise during the first half of the 1990s. Deng Xiaoping’s
renewed emphasis on the development of the coastal regions in 1992 was
seen to have unduly disadvantaged the interior regions and led to a rapid
growth of the economic and social gaps – found to be worse than in the
disintegrating polity of the former Yugoslavia. The excessive gaps were
ascribed to biased government investments that increased the existing
regional disparity stemming from natural and historical factors. The
central policy of privileging the eastern seaboard, particularly the special
economic zones, meant that foreign direct investment went almost exclu-
sively there and thus reinforced the trend. In consequence, distinctions
had sharpened between the privileged “rich” in the coastal areas and the
populace of the backward parts of the interior who were showing growing
political discontent. Instead of balancing regional interests, the central
government had fallen prey to single provinces which tried to capture the
initiative of central policy-making. If no remedy was forthcoming soon,
political stability and national unity would be endangered. As the case of
Yugoslavia had shown, national conflicts are not the causes of regional
differences, but their results.
In the face of these perceived dangers, Hu and his colleagues appealed
to the central government to fulfil its important function of providing
balanced regional development and solving the urgent social and political
problems associated with rising economic disparity – something the
market economy was not providing. While the role of the market was to
safeguard efficiency, the role of the government was to realize social
equality and justice. The task was seen as particularly pressing in the case
of the western region where many ethnic minorities were concentrated. In
order to accelerate economic development in minority areas and thus to
prevent social and political conflicts from intensifying further, minority
areas should be helped with special funds. Locally available resources
should be utilized more efficiently on an integrated national market, while
environmental pollution should be controlled at the same time.
Most fundamentally, in order to play the “lead role” as advocate of
social equality and interest regulator in the country’s transition process,
the central government had to strengthen its financial capacity. The share
of central financial revenues and expenditure in GDP was found to have
sunk to a record low in 1994, indeed the lowest in the world. If central
government wanted to correct the existing economic, social and political
inequalities, it had to define a bottom line of decentralization, consolidate
12. Hu Angang et al., Report on China’s Regional Disparity; Wang Shaoguang and Hu
Angang, The Political Economy of Uneven Development. The Case of China (Armonk, NY:
M. E. Sharpe, 1999; Hu Angang, Diqu yu fazhan: xibu kaifa xin zhanlu¨e (Regions and
Development: The New Strategy of Opening Up the West) (Beijing: Zhongguo jihua
chubanshe, 2001).
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its fiscal base and establish a system of financial transfers that supported
the weaker provincial units. To strengthen the democratic participation of
all provinces in central policy-making, a new institutional design should
be set up for political consultation between the central authorities and
localities, giving western and central region representatives more leverage
in the National People’s Congress Standing Committee and in relevant
ministries and commissions of the State Council. Decisions on public
policies should be passed on majority votes, with each provincial jurisdic-
tion having one vote.13
Hu Angang propagated these arguments and proposals not only in his
publications but also at numerous conferences and policy meetings. It is
not surprising that he found many supporters among representatives of
the inland provincial jurisdictions. On the other hand, his blueprint for the
Open Up the West policy seems also to have been particularly acceptable
to central policy-makers as, in his analysis, the central party-state has a
specific role in regional development. Stressing the lead role of the
central government with solid fiscal capacities to balance regional inter-
ests and to intervene where market failures produce social inequality, Hu
Angang made a strong plea for a powerful and resourceful central
party-state – a plea that must indeed have appealed to central policy-mak-
ers.
Going Global – the Challenges and Enticements of WTO Accession
According to Party historiography, Jiang Zemin is understood to have
made his first references to the Open Up the West policy in March, June
and August 1999.14 While there were no official media reports in March,
Jiang was quoted in the Chinese press as giving a speech at a central
conference on poverty alleviation on 9 June:
There are conditions already in place for accelerating the speed of development of the
central and western regions, and time is already ripe. While continuing with
development of the eastern coastal region, we must not miss the opportunity to
accelerate the development of the central and western regions. From now on, the
Party and the government must regard the great development of the west as a major
strategic mission and give the issue priority over everything else.15
No official report is available on Jiang’s statements in August, probably
made during the annual convention of the Party leadership at Beidaihe.
However, in mid-November 1999, after several investigation tours by
prime minister Zhu Rongji to Shaanxi, Yunnan, Sichuan, Gansu, Qinghai
and Ningxia between August and October, the Open Up the West strategy
13. For these specific proposals see Hu Angang et al., Report on China’s Regional
Disparity, pp. 108–124.
14. Huang Liancheng, “Xibu da kaifa shi ‘di er ge daju” ’ (“Opening Up the West is the
‘second overall situation’ ”), Jingbao (The Mirror), February 2000,pp. 30–33 at p. 30.
15. Renmin ribao, 10 June 1999; for a similar rhetoric see Renmin ribao, 19 June 1999.
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was made into an official policy of the party-state.16 At the annual
national economic work conference of the CCP Central Committee, it
was concluded that “conditions are basically in place for the research and
implementation of the strategy for the great development of the western
region, and time is already ripe.”17
These quotations suggest that “time” was an important concept in the
new policy’s development. Jiang Zemin’s repeated emphasis on the right
time and the opportunity not to be missed may be read as a rhetorical
kow-tow to Deng Xiaoping’s “two overall situations” which envisaged
the turn of the century as the start of the regional policy shift. However,
in the specific political context of the year 1999, the parallel process of
China’s WTO accession negotiations is also an important background
factor. The American president Bill Clinton as well as Jiang Zemin and
Premier Zhu Rongji had made new initiatives to revitalize the stagnating
WTO negotiations in spring 1999. In April, Zhu Rongji travelled to the
United States to find a viable compromise on some of the tougher issues
of the bilateral negotiations. The rapprochement of the two sides was
interrupted when the Americans turned down a list of Chinese conces-
sions which Zhu Rongji had offered during his visit; and the destruction
of the Chinese embassy by NATO bombs in Belgrade added to the
temporary halt in dialogue. In autumn 1999, however, the Clinton admin-
istration decided to resume negotiations, and after some intensive talks, a
bilateral agreement was struck on15 November – a step that was regarded
as a major breakthrough in the then 13-year long negotiation process.18
The parallel timing of the rapprochement in WTO negotiations and the
formulation of the Open Up the West policy can hardly be mere coinci-
dence. Rather, the new policy seems to have taken its initial shape against
the strategic background of China’s expected WTO accession.
In China WTO accession was seen as a painful challenge to various
sectors of the domestic economy. As Chinese publications of the time
revealed, the opening of domestic markets would inevitably expose all
industries to international competition, with particularly heavy impacts
expected for agriculture and the ailing heavy industry of the state sector.
Very obviously under this scenario, the interior regions where these
industries dominated would suffer most after accession. While it was
made clear that WTO rules did allow for certain protectionist policies for
economically backward regions during a transition period, it was simi-
larly clear that over the longer run, these regions eventually would have
to face the pressure of international competition and business rules.
Confronted with the menace of industrial breakdown and accelerated
16. See Norihiro Sasaki, “Political analysis of the strategy for developing the western
region,” in Yasuo Onishi (ed.), China’s Western Development Strategy. Issues and Prospects
(Institute of Developing Economies, Spot Survey, Chiba, December 2001, ch. 2, pp. 17–30
at pp. 17–18; Xinhua, 5 November 1999.
17. Renmin ribao, 18 November 1999; Sasaki, “Political analysis,” p. 18.
18. Heike Holbig, “Chinas WTO-Beitritt in politischer Perspektive — Wechselspiel
zwischen nationalen und internationalen Verhandlungsprozessen,” China aktuell, December
1999, pp. 1251–65.
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destitution of large parts of the rural populace in China’s interior, the
leadership came under extreme pressure from provincial jurisdictions to
provide a viable counter-strategy.19
At the same time, the expectation of WTO accession produced enor-
mous enticements. In an early scholarly publication on the Open Up the
West policy sponsored by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic
Cooperation (MOFTEC) Long Yongtu, then vice-minister and chief
WTO negotiator, philosophized:
At the turn of the century, China has speeded up its march towards reform and
opening up, the most important sign of this being the fact that China has reached a
breakthrough in WTO accession negotiations and a considerable acceleration of the
accession process. Under these international and domestic circumstances, to greatly
develop the west must first of all mean to strive hard to greatly open up the west to
the outside world. Only if the west is allowed to march towards the world, will it be
able to establish an adequate development mentality, to absorb the inflow of
international factors of production and to raise its overall quality through the global
exchange of information.20
The prospect of immeasurable sums of foreign direct investment flooding
the country seems to have been omnipresent at the time, creating the
impression of an immediate abundance of foreign investments particu-
larly in the central and western regions which had been neglected during
the early reform period.
As many official statements and documents published up to summer
2000 bear witness, this foreign investment euphoria dominated the initial
agenda of the Open Up the West policy, leading to intense contests
between provincial jurisdictions in the western and central region to
obtain preferential measures.21 Although both political leaders and ex-
perts warned consistently that conditions in the interior were not the same
as in coastal areas and that “preferential measures … are no longer
preferential if everyone gets the same treatment,”22 competition among
19. See, for example, the statement of a Shaanxi representative in Vermeer’s contribution
to this volume. The north-eastern “rust-belt” provinces with their high levels of ailing state
industries stemming from the Japanese developmental programme in pre-war Manchuria are
another case in point here. While Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning provinces could equally
claim to be compensated for the economic and social impact expected after WTO accession,
they did not qualify to belong to the “poor interior” according to the prevailing ideological
geography. However, financial support was offered to those three provinces not much later.
Fearing that wide-spread social unrest could break out in the region after a dynamic labour
movement had formed there in early 2002, the CCP’s 16th National Congress in autumn 2002
made a landmark decision to revitalize the north-east. A formal government programme to
“rejuvenate the old industrial bases in north-east China” by 2010 was launched in September
2003; see Xinhua, 12, 13 October, 27 November 2003; Xinhua (English service), 14, 28
October 2003.
20. Gao Zhengang et al., The Path Towards Opening Up the West, p. 2–3.
21. For the specific measures see Sasaki, “Political analysis,” pp. 24–25; H. H. Lai and
Harry Hongyi, “China’s western development program. Its rationale, implementation, and
prospects,” Modern China, Vol. 28, No. 4 (October 2002), pp. 432–466.
22. Li Yixue, “Xibu diqu jiakuai fazhan mianlin yanjun tiaozhan” (“Severe challenges
facing the accelerated development of the western regions”), Hongguan guanli (Macroeco-
nomic Management), No. 9 (1999), p. 21; for early criticism of the interior provinces’ FDI
rush and competition for preferential policies see Xinhua, 29 January 2000, South China
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western provincial jurisdictions for foreign trade privileges seemed to
escalate during this first stage of implementation. Faced with an external
obligation gradually to phase out protectionist measures over a certain
transition period after China’s WTO accession, the official rhetoric of
“not missing the opportunity” seemed to imply that the interior regions
had little time left to catch up with the coastal areas and gain a foothold
in the world of global competition.
Setting up the Organisational Framework – the SDPC’s Playground
When the Open Up the West strategy was declared official state policy
in November 1999, an organizational framework for the new policy had
already been cast. Media reports during the following weeks indicated
that Premier Zhu Rongji and Vice-Premier Wen Jiabao had been ap-
pointed head and deputy head of a newly formed “State Council Leading
Group for Western Region Development” whose tasks were defined as
guiding, organizing and executing various stages of the new policy.23
Unlike most other “leading groups” which had sprung up during the
reform period each time a new policy priority arose, this new institution
was not formally affiliated with the CCP Central Committee but with the
State Council. It was extremely large, comprising 17 members (later to
become 23)24 all of them with the rank of ministers or heads of Central
Committee departments.
The Leading Group for Western Region Development (Table 1) repre-
sents a collection of high-level Party and government leaders whose
portfolios are best described in terms of macroeconomic and financial
work, administration of infrastructure and resources, and as propaganda
and public relations. This line-up suggests that the leading group was to
serve as a high-level forum for the co-ordination and balancing of
divergent departmental interests involved in the new strategy. At the
same time, its composition was much closer to a board with vague
consultation and co-ordination functions than a specialized administrative
organ with clear-cut competences. With a low degree of regional exper-
tise and specialization, the leading group did not promise to become a
very effective working body. The broad participation of representatives
from propaganda, media, culture and nationalities affairs instead signified
the launch of a large-scale party-state campaign.25 On the other hand, the
footnote continued
Morning Post (SCMP), 3, 9 March 2000; Zhongguo xinwen she (ZXS), 5 September 2000;
Xinhua (English service), 21, 24 October, 1 November 2000.
23. SCMP, 22 November 1999; ZTS, 3 February 2000. After the State Council reshuffling
of March 2003, the new Premier Wen Jiabao was named head of the leadership group, with
new Vice-Premier Zeng Peiyan serving as deputy head; Xinhua, 10 June 2003.
24. “2001 Zhongguo xibu luntan’ jintian zai Xi’an juxing” (“The ‘2001 China West
Forum’ taking place in Xi’an today”), www.sdpc.gov.cn/e/e200109061.htm.
25. For a critical assessment of the leading group see Sasaki, “Political analysis”; Song
Jiankun and Wu Jinming, Quyu jingji fazhan de longxing zhanlu¨e (The Dragon-shaped
Strategy of Regional Economic Development) (Beijing: Zhongguo shibao jingji chubanshe,
2002), pp. 142–43.
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Table 1: Composition of the Western Region Development Leading
Group
Title Name Affiliation with CCP / government institution
Head Zhu Rongji Premier
Deputy head Wen Jiabao Vice-premier
Members Zeng Peiyan Minister of the State Development Planning
Commission (SDPC)
Sheng Huaren Minister of the State Economic and Trade
Commission (SETC)
Chen Zhili Minister of Education
Zhu Lilan Minister of Science and Technology
Liu Jibin Minister of the Commission of Science,
Technology and Industry for National
Defence (COSTIND)
Li Dezhu Minister of the State Nationalities Affairs
Commission
Xiang Huaicheng Minister of Finance
Tian Fengshan Minister of Land and Natural Resources
Fu Zhihuan Minister of Railways
Huang Zhendong Minister of Communications
Wu Jichuan Minister of Informations Technology and
Telecom Industry
Wang Shucheng Minister of Water Resources
Sun Jiazheng Minister of Culture
Dai Xianglong Governor of the People’s Bank of China
Liu Yunshan Deputy head of the CCP Propaganda
Department
Tian Congming Director of State Administration of Radio,
Film and Television
Wang Zhibao Director of State Forestry Bureau
Wan Xueyuan Director of State Bureau of Foreign Experts
Source:
Zhongguo tongxun she (Hong Kong), 3 February 2000; Norihiro Sasaki, “Political
analysis of the strategy for developing the western region,” in Yasuo Onishi (ed.),
China’s Western Development Strategy. Issues and Prospects (Institute of Developing
Economies, Spot Survey, Chiba, December 2001, ch. 2, pp. 17–30 at p. 18.
State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA) was conspicuously ab-
sent (and still is today), a fact which might result from this agency’s early
critical assessments of the ecological damage that could be caused by an
irrational development craze.26 While ecological construction is given top
priority in official discourse, many Chinese environmentalists fear that
without SEPA’s direct input in the planning process, environmental
protection will not be integrated with economic development in a com-
26. US Embassy, Beijing, “The environment at the NPC plenary,” 2000,
www.usembassychina.org.cn/english/sandt/npcenviro.htm.
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prehensive manner but rather be reduced to a series of secondary cam-
paigns.27
To tackle the deficits in administrative efficiency and to deal with
day-to-day business, an “Office of the State Council Leading Group for
Western Region Development” was established under the aegis of the
State Development Planning Commission (SDPC) in Beijing. Consisting
of several divisions, including comprehensive planning, economy and
society, agriculture and forestry, and core human resources, the office
was assigned the tasks of research and proposing specific policy in these
various fields.28 Zeng Peiyan, head of the SDPC and member of the
leading group, was appointed office director. The office seems to have a
staff of only about ten officials recruited from the State Council’s
Economic Restructuring Office, the State Council’s Development Re-
search Centre and other units.29 With so few staff, it can be presumed that
the SDPC’s personnel resources are regularly made use of in the day-to-
day management of the Open Up the West policy. Thus, it seems likely
that since the inauguration of the new policy, the SDPC has wielded
strong influence on its formulation as well as its implementation.
It does not seem too far-fetched to suggest that by vesting the SDPC
with the institutional power to put this new policy into practice, it was
compensated for the loss of competences it had suffered in earlier years.
The status of the once powerful State Planning Commission had declined
gradually over the reform period with the introduction of market econ-
omy elements. It had reached a low in the wake of the administrative
reforms initiated by Zhu Rongji in spring 1998 when the State Economic
and Trade Commission (SETC) was upgraded to form a “super ministry”
in charge of the domestic economy, and the competences of the SDPC
were limited to the formulation of long-term macroeconomic strategies
and development programmes.30 By obtaining effective authority over the
Open Up the West policy, the SDPC regained some of its former
institutional leverage. The trend of upgrading the SDPC has been
confirmed by the most recent reorganization of the State Council in
March 2003 which included the SDPC’s transformation into the “State
Development and Reform Commission” (SDRC) and expanding its com-
petences to include day-to-day macroeconomic regulation and reform.31
While this move clearly is meant to signify an ongoing organizational
evolution in the commission’s image from command-style economic
planning to a more modern management of the market economy, it may
27. Elizabeth Economy, “China’s go west campaign: ecological construction or ecological
exploitation,” China Environment Series, Issue 5 (2002), pp. 1–10.
28. The new office was modelled on the Special Economic Zone Office under the State
Council which had been established in September 1984, ranking at the same administrative
level as the Taiwan Affairs Office or the Overseas Chinese Office; see Sasaki, “Political
analysis,” p. 19; Malcolm Lamb, Directory of Officials and Organizations in China. A
Quarter-Century Guide (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), p. 352.
29. See ZTS, 3 February 2000; Sasaki, “Political analysis,” p. 19.
30. See Sebastian Heilmann, “Die neue chinesische Regierung: Abschied vom sozialistis-
chen Leviathan?,” China aktuell, March 1998, pp. 277–287.
31. Xinhua, 6 March 2003.
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be doubted whether its actual modus operandi has evolved in parallel.
Particularly from the perspective of the SDPC’s (now SDRC’s) suborga-
nizations at the provincial and local levels, now in charge of the co-ordi-
nation of the implementation of relevant elements of the new policy in
their territories, the Open Up the West programme seems to be perceived
as an alluring playground for the projection of bureaucratic power over
other departments.32
Shifting Priorities and Competing Agendas
The SDPC had begun work even before the leading group was
formally established, drawing up an implementation plan for the Open Up
the West strategy in late October 1999. The plan consisted of measures
in four fields: infrastructure construction; ecological protection; industrial
restructuring; and the development of science and technology (S&T),
education, and human resources.33 By January 2000, the Western Region
Development Office presented a draft for a more detailed scheme adding
the strengthening of “reform and opening-up” as a fifth point,34 a sup-
plement that might relate to MOFTEC demands. In April 2000, the SDPC
announced “ten major projects” – the first in a series of annual lists of
large-scale infrastructure projects such as natural gas and water pipelines,
railway lines, expressways, or airports – the west-east gas pipeline
project, the west-east power transmission project and the Qinghai–Tibet
railway ranging among the most costly.35
Thus, from the very beginning the SDPC, through the Western Region
Development Office, has formulated core parts of the Open Up the West
agenda. SDPC policy documents suggest that this can be understood as a
macroeconomic version of “killing two birds with one stone.” By increas-
ing the ratio of state investment in the western regions and channelling
them into large-scale infrastructure projects, the west is to be developed
rapidly along strategic transport and communication lines; at the same
time, increased state investments will raise domestic demand and help to
tackle the country’s sustained deflation. The SDPC’s Open Up the West
discourse seems to be centred around a somehow mechanistic assumption
32. The SDPC’s authorization as leading organ for the implementation of the Open Up the
West policy has been formally acknowledged in the “ ‘Shiwu’ xibu kaifa zongti guihua,”
published 25 February 2002, in Shishi xibu da kaifa zongti guihua he zhengce cuoshi (The
Overall Plan of Western Region Development and Related Policy Measures) (Beijing:
Zhongguo jihua chubanshe, 2002 (bilingual Chinese/English edition)), pp. 1–25, 89–131.
33. Renmin ribao, 1 November 1999.
34. Renmin ribao, 24 January 2000.
35. By late 2002, the central government had launched 36 key construction projects in the
western region; see Western Region Development Office of the State Council, “A briefing
on the implementation of the western region development programme,” 12 November 2002.
For the specific lists of projects announced in 2000, 2001 and 2002, see Xinhua, 11 April 2000;
“2001 Zhongguo xibu luntan” (“The 2001 China western forum”), www.sdpc.gov.cn/e/
e200109061.htm; “2002 nian xibu kaifa gongzuo de zhuyao renwu he cuoshi” (“Tasks and
measures in the Open Up the West work in 2002”), 6 June 2002, www.chinawest.gov.cn/chi-
nese/asp/showinfo.asp?name200206060001; see also Lai and Hongyi, “China’s western
development program.”
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that central finances spent for large infrastructure projects will more or
less automatically enhance the integration of the western regions into the
national socio-economic system.
While the SDPC delivered the core agenda of the Open Up the West
policy, other agendas have been clustered around it and priorities shifted
over time according to the changing assertion of departmental and
regional interests. Soon after the policy’s official inauguration, the State
Development Bank and the Ministries of Communications, Railways,
Water Resources, Forestry, Land and Natural Resources, and Science and
Technology produced special construction and financial plans. In addition
the CCP Organization Department, the CCP United Front Department,
the State Nationalities Affairs Commission, and the Ministries of Person-
nel and Education became active during the first half of 2000, presenting
plans for the training of cadres and other personnel from the western
provinces, for the dispatch of qualified S&T personnel to the west, and
for the promotion of compulsory education.36
After this vigorous start, however, the process of policy formulation
and implementation was delayed significantly. A “Circular of the State
Council on policies and measures pertaining to the development of the
western region,”37 giving a general outline of policy instruments, was
promulgated in October 2000, but it took almost a year until the more
detailed “Suggestions on the implementation of policies and measures
pertaining to the development of the western region”38 (based on the
Circular) were authorized for distribution by the State Council in Septem-
ber 2001. Compared to the four-point scheme of late 1999, there is a
much stronger emphasis on improving the investment climate for dom-
estic as well as foreign investors. While ecological goals are not men-
tioned in the Suggestions, the special developmental, financial and human
resources needs of ethnic minority areas are given some emphasis.
An important reason for this delay can be found in the bureaucratic
mechanisms of incorporating the Open Up the West policy into the
five-year planning framework. The Tenth Five-year Plan (2001–2005),
parts of which had to be reformulated after the new policy had been
inaugurated in late 1999, was announced at the National People’s Con-
gress in March 2001.39 While it included only a rather tentative blueprint
for the new policy, details of the plan had to be negotiated with relevant
ministries and departments as well as the provincial-level jurisdictions
involved. Eleven months later, in February 2002, the SDPC and the
Western Region Development Office completed their “Overall plan of
western region development during the Tenth Five-year Plan period,” in
36. Sasaki, “Political analysis,” pp. 19–20; see also the list of government documents,
www.chinawest.gov.cn/chinese/asp/showinfo.asp?idw.
37. “Guowuyuan guanyu shishi xibu da kaifa ruogan zhengce cuoshi de tongzhi,” Guo fa
(2000) 33 hao, 29 December 2000, www.chinawest.gov.cn/chinese/asp/show-
info.asp?name20012290014.
38. “Guanyu xibu da kaifa ruogan zhengce cuoshi de shishi yijian,” 28 August 2001,
www.chinawest.gov.cn/chinese/asp/showinfo.asp?name20012290014.
39. Jingji ribao (Economic Daily), 18 March 2003.
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which they presented a rhetorically neat hierarchy of guiding principles,
goals and policy measures.40
According to this overall plan, the “overarching strategic goal” of the
Open Up the West policy was to attain nation-wide modernization,
diminish regional disparities and transform the western region into a
“prosperous and advanced new west where life is stable, ethnic groups
are united, and the landscape is beautiful.” During the Tenth Five-year
Plan period, the specific goals for the western region were to: improve
infrastructure; carry out ecological improvement and contain environmen-
tal degradation; improve the market competitiveness of local products,
the quality of economic growth and economic efficiency; promote S&T
and human resources; promote the process of urbanization; accelerate
reform of state-owned enterprises and increase the proportion of non-pub-
lic enterprises and of foreign enterprises; and reduce rural poverty and
regional income disparities. Again, the document reveals a strong pre-
occupation with large-scale infrastructure construction, which takes up
around one-third of its length. Numerous infrastructure projects are
woven into a network of inter-provincial economic zones that are to be
developed along main “communication arteries,” namely the Longhai–
Lanzhou–Xinjiang railway, the upper reach of the Chang [Yangtze]
River, the Nanning–Guiyang–Kunming area, as well as Tibet, Xinjiang
and other minority regions. It is thus envisaged that extensive areas will
develop into future economic belts, revealing a grand vision of integrat-
ing the western backwater into the national realm of urbanity, wealth and
enlightenment. Even more ambitious, the new policy is claimed to be not
only of economic but also of political significance, as it aims to
“eliminate regional disparities gradually, consolidate the unity of ethnic
groups, ensure border safety and social stability, and promote social
progress.” On the other hand, environmental protection is addressed
through a series of isolated campaigns to ban logging, afforest the region
and control water pollution. Formulated to mobilize official and public
support for particular challenges, these campaigns emphasize grand
sweeping gestures at the expense of long-term planning and closely
monitored implementation.41
These documents provide a proliferation of economic, social, ecologi-
cal, political and ideological goals that are sought to be fulfilled by an
increasingly wide and disparate array of policy measures. Some potential
conflicts between the goals may have become exacerbated through the
implementation of the Open Up the West policy. These include conflicts
between state investment and market-led growth, between large-scale
infrastructure construction and ecological goals, and between forced
economic development of minority areas and the maintenance of social
40. The Overall Plan of Western Region Development. For the formulation process of the
plan see Li Zibin, “Caiqu youli cuoshi, zhichi xibu kaifa” (“Take effective measures, support
Opening Up the West”), www.sdpc.gov.cn/e/e200109061.htm.
41. Quotations are taken from the English version of The Overall Plan of Western Region
Development, pp. 91, 98–99; for an assessment of ecological aspects see Economy, “China’s
go west campaign.”
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and political stability. Yet the policy documents give no clue at all how
to resolve these potential conflicts. Rather, the process of formulation and
implementation of the new policy seems to be meandering through a
cluster of diverse, sometimes competing agendas bearing the stamp and
serving the interests of many different agents.
Who’s In, Who’s Out? The Dynamic of Centre–Province Relations
The diverse nature of the Open Up the West policy and the diffuse
decision-making process created space for a dynamic interplay between
the central party-state and provincial jurisdictions. When they received
signals that some of the privileges formerly given to the coastal areas
would now be granted to the hinterland, interior provinces started to
bargain on the basis of the numerous goals set by the central leadership.
In a drawn-out process, provincial actors tried to maximize their benefits,
competing for state investments, infrastructure projects, special FDI
policies, ecological and minority area projects, and other preferential
measures of all kinds. While the specific bargaining mechanisms are
unclear, it seems that provincial interests were voiced through personal
representatives in the central leadership, and through institutionalized
channels such as national working conferences and annual sessions of the
National People’s Congress and the Chinese Political Consultative Con-
ference.42 Other important forums for provincial lobbying were the
conferences and symposia organized in various provincial capitals after
early 2000. With the attendance of top leaders, these conferences proved
to be of direct benefit to the provincial-level jurisdictions who had the
honour to host them, and other provincial representatives also took the
opportunity to gather with representatives from the central leadership to
emphasize their special development needs.43
The demarcation of regions as part of the development programme to
Open Up the West was not clear from the beginning. According to Deng
Xiaoping’s strategy of “two overall situations,” coastal areas were now
expected to subordinate their interests to the “interior areas” but without
specifying which provincial jurisdictions precisely were to be included.
Looking at the formative academic discourse of the latter part of the
1990s, central and western regions had always been mentioned in one
breath as those entitled to enjoy the benefits of the new development
strategy. According to the geographic categorization prevalent during the
Ninth Five-year Plan, the central region comprised nine provincial juris-
dictions (Heilongjiang, Jilin, Inner Mongolia, Hubei, Shanxi, Hunan,
Anhui, Jiangxi and Henan) while the western region comprised ten
42. Sasaki, “Political analysis,” p. 24.
43. Conferences were held in May 2000 in Kunming, in October 2000 in Chengdu; in
September 2001 in Xi’an; and in April and May 2002 in Xi’an and Chongqing (with Jiang
Zemin attending); see Xinhua, 17 May, 21 October 2000, 5 September 2001; Heike Holbig,
“Politischer Auftrieb fu¨r Strategie ‘Aufbau West’,” China aktuell, May 2002, pp. 499–500.
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(Xinjiang, Qinghai, Gansu, Ningxia, Shaanxi, Tibet, Yunnan, Sichuan,
Chongqing and Guizhou).44
The same broad regional definition underlay the early statements on the
Open Up the West strategy Jiang Zemin made in 1999 – most explicitly
in his June 1999 speeches where he consistently talked about central and
western China together. Also, in June 2000, SETC, SDPC and MOFTEC
drew up a list of special local industries to enjoy preferential treatment to
attract foreign investors which included 20 provincial jurisdictions: the 19
in western and central China plus, surprisingly, the Guangxi Autonomous
Region which, as part of the eastern region, had already received many
benefits in the course of the coastal development strategy in the 1980s
and early 1990s.45
Financial constraints of the central budget might have been the main
reason why this large number could not be maintained. Also, from a
developmental perspective of resource allocation, it did not seem reason-
able to divide the pie among 19 (or 20) provincial-level jurisdictions.
Thus, during the first half of 2000, the Open Up the West policy was
limited to the western region only in a narrow sense. The central region
became a developmental “bridge” between east and west – a term that
caused strong resentment among central China representatives as it
implied that they, for the time being, were not to receive any special
funds or preferential treatments from the centre.46
Various tactics used by central leaders to rein in inter-provincial
conflicts can be observed. At a meeting on financial matters in January
2000, Premier Zhu Rongji admonished “various localities” to “take into
account China’s overall modernization drive and strategies” and to “align
ideologies and actions with the Party Central Committee’s important
decisions.”47 At the National People’s Congress in March 2000, where
officials from inland provinces expressed their strong desire for an
economic take-off, they were warned by senior leaders not to take
advantage of the new policy to hatch fantastic or wasteful projects and
resolutely to curb corruption.48 Over the following months, central
government representatives repeatedly criticized inland provinces for
their “gold-rush mentality” and their blind zeal for special economic
zones and other privileges. Zhu Rongji warned against “tendencies like
rushing headlong into mass action and formalism in the development of
China’s vast western areas” instead of developing the region in a “down-
to-earth-manner.”49
44. For the geographic categorization and socio-economic development of Chinese
provinces see Margot Schu¨ller and Constanze Kriete, “Entwicklung Westchina — Visionen
und Realisierungschancen,” China aktuell, October 2002, pp. 1139–55.
45. “Zhong xi bu diqu waishang touzi youshi chanye mulu” (“List of industries in central
and western regions attractive for foreign investors”), www.chinawest.gov.cn/chinese/asp/
showinfo.asp?name20000610002.
46. Author’s interviews with government and business representatives in Henan and Hubei
provinces in June and July 2000.
47. Xinhua (English service), 23 January 2000.
48. SCMP, 3, 9 March 2000.
49. Xinhua (English service), 24 October 2000; see also ZXS, 5 October 2000; Xinhua
(English service), 21 October 2000.
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In addition to this kind of criticism directly aimed at disciplining
provincial behaviour, another more subtle tactic can be discerned in the
refusal of central leaders to give a comprehensive estimate of the funds
earmarked for the Open Up the West programme. While some official
figures about state investments for particular infrastructure projects have
been produced, no clear information has been given in advance on the
provision of central funds for the programme at large with its numerous
economic, technological, human resources, social and ecological mea-
sures.50 This discretion could partly stem from a lack of integrated central
planning and the constant shifting of agendas. On the other hand, a lack
of financial transparency could also be intended by central leaders to
prevent provincial jurisdictions from claiming their share of the prospec-
tive pie too aggressively.
Senior leaders emphasized two special goals of the Open Up the West
policy, presumably directed at legitimizing the exclusion of the central
region. First, ecological aspects were stressed, including the need to solve
problems in a “trans-regional” manner. Thus, the south-west was upgraded
as an ecological problem zone because of the erosion of soils and the
devastating floods originating there; likewise, the north-west was identified
as a geographic macro-region suffering from a notorious shortage of water,
leading to rapid desertification that caused serious consequences for the
whole of China. The central region, however – although it suffers equally
from ecological degradation – was not identified as a homeland of nat-
urally-bestowed overarching ecological problems.51 Secondly, political as-
pects related to the minority nationality areas were emphasized. If minority
nationalities were not given better chances for economic development, it
was argued, then social harmony, political stability and national security
would be in danger. As the country’s minority nationalities were concen-
trated in the western region, this was another ready-made justification for
excluding the central provinces from the scheme.
By emphasizing these special goals, however, the back door was
opened for exceptions to be made in the case of single provincial-level
jurisdictions. Thus, Inner Mongolia managed to be included on ecological
grounds: as part of the arid zone of China’s north, and as a region
bordering the problem area of the Huang [Yellow] River, it formed part
of the ecological system of north-west China.52 In the media, the regular
sandstorms befalling Beijing every year were traced back in particular to
50. Financial data are usually given only a posteriori. For example, at the 16th Party
Congress in November 2002, it was revealed that the central government had injected 260
billion RMB yuan into developing China’s west during the three years 1999–2001; of the total,
about 200 billion yuan were allocated for infrastructure, 50 billion yuan for environmental
projects and over 10 billion yuan for social undertakings; see http:www.16congress.org.cn/
english/features/48601.
51. Xinhua, 20 April 2000; Ministry of Science and Technology, “Guanyu jiaqiang xibu
da kaifa keji gongzuo de ruogan yijian” (“Suggestions on strengthening scientific and
technological activities in the western development”), 11 August 2000,
www.chinawest.gov.cn/chinese/asp/showinfo.asp?name200008110002.
52. Author’s interviews with Eva Sternfeld, China Environment & Sustainable Develop-
ment Reference & Research Centre, SEPA, 25 June 2001, and with representatives from the
Administrative Centre for China’s Agenda 21, Ministry of Science and Technology, 25 June
2001.
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the desertification of Inner Mongolia. In summer 2000, Zhu Rongji was
quoted as saying: “We will have to move the capital from Beijing unless
we can stop the desertification.”53 Similarly, the emphasis on the develop-
ment of minority areas seems to have served as a welcome legitimization
to include the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region as part of China’s
new “west.” Thus, 12 provincial-level jurisdictions were eventually in-
cluded in the Open Up the West policy by autumn 2000.54
Still later in the bargaining process, however, three other central region
provinces managed to have one autonomous prefecture within their territo-
ries included in the scheme, again on the ground of being home to
minority nationalities. According to the State Council’s Suggestions of
September 2001, the Xiangxi Tujia–Miao Autonomous Prefecture of
Hunan province, the Enshi Tujia–Miao Autonomous Prefecture of Hubei
province, and the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture of Jilin prov-
ince were entitled to receive “preferential treatments … in the light of
related policies and measures.”55 According to a representative of the
Western Region Development Office, the three autonomous prefectures
had actually been included during the first half of 2001.56 By now, China’s
“west” reached from the Korean border in the north to the Beibu Gulf in
the south, while the major part of central China had been excluded.
Economic growth figures for 2002 demonstrate clearly that it pays to be
part of China’s new west: nominal growth rates of the provincial-level
jurisdictions included in the Open Up the West policy have already started
to rise significantly. According to the State Statistical Bureau’s GDP data
for 2002, with the exception of Xinjiang and Yunnan which had experi-
enced relatively high growth rates in the years before 1998 but lower rates
since,57 the other ten “western” provinces recorded economic growth rates
of 10.6 per cent on average. Leading were Tibet and Qinghai, each with
12.4 per cent (higher than the coastal province of Zhejiang with 12.3 per
cent), and Inner Mongolia with 11.6 per cent (the same as the coastal
province of Jiangsu); Guangxi, with 10.3 per cent, also recorded above-av-
erage rates. The bulk of central region provinces, however, were the
“losers” of the regional bargaining process, recording an average growth
of “only” 9.6 per cent, with Anhui at the bottom with 8.9 per cent.58
53. Nihon keizai shimbun, 20 August 2000, cited from Sasaki, “Political analysis,” n. 31,
p. 29.
54. See the list of provincial jurisdictions included as given in the “Circular of the State
Council on policies and measures pertaining to the development of the western region,”
pp. 12–13.
55. “Suggestions on the implementation of policies and measures pertaining to the
development of the western region,” pp. 150–51.
56. Author’s interview with Hu Changshun, 7 April 2001.
57. Schu¨ller and Kriete, “Entwicklung Westchina,” p. 1141.
58. Chi-Chu Tschang, “China’s provinces all grew faster than national average in 2002,”
Bloomberg News Archive, 5 February 2003, http://quote.bloomberg.com/fgcgi.cgi?
ptitleEconomies&s1blk&tp ad topright econ&Tmarkets box.ht&s2blk&bt
ad position1 economies&box  ad box all&tag  economy&middle  ad frame2 e
conomies&sAPj.jvRWAQ2hpbmEn. It has to be noted here that the average of provincial
growth data is two percentage points higher than the figure for national economic growth
which is given as 8% for 2002, a phenomenon discussed widely by economists.
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Being included in the Open Up the West policy, however, seems to pay
off not only in terms of economic but also of political capital. In the new
Central Committee of the CCP elected at the 16th Party Congress in
November 2002, representation of Party and government leaders from
western provinces is significantly higher than in the 15th Committee
elected in autumn 1997: up from 55 full and alternative members to 60.
The “winners” are Xinjiang with two more full memberships, Tibet with
one more full membership, and Shaanxi and Guangxi with one more
alternate membership each. The number of Central Committee members
from the central region provinces, on the other hand, has remained
constant.59
In the new Politburo, one-third of the 24 full members have a personal
background in China’s west: Wen Jiabao gained substantial working
experience in Gansu, Wang Lequan in Xinjiang, Liu Yunshan in Inner
Mongolia, Zhou Yongkang in Sichuan, He Guoqiang in Chongqing, Guo
Boxiong in Gansu, Zeng Peiyan in Shaanxi and, most prominently, Hu
Jintao in Gansu, Guizhou and Tibet. Immediately after his inauguration as
new CCP secretary-general, Hu gave high priority to the Open Up the
West policy as part of his attempts to establish a profile as advocate of
the country’s poor. Hu – whose political power is based heavily on the
support of inland provincial-level jurisdictions – has appeared as a
staunch proponent of the economic development of China’s west.60
Looking back at the dynamic of centre–province relations, it is clear
that interactions at and above the provincial level have so far been an
inherent part of the national decision-making process. On the one hand,
pressure from the interior regions – and resistance by eastern and later by
central region provinces who increasingly felt neglected – has had
significant impact on the formulation of the Open Up the West policy.
Concerted initiatives by local administrators and scholars, particularly
from provincial jurisdictions in the south-west, have been running ahead
of and reacted to central initiatives. On the other hand, as just noted,
implementation of the policy has been shaped by provincial strategies to
jump on the bandwagon of the party-state campaign and to maximize
benefits. In a sense, too, the new policy has produced its own actors as
representatives of the west have been promoted to the central leadership
and gained influence in the national policy-making process.
Conclusion: Soft Policy under Hardening Budget Constraints
In contrast to the initial quote eulogizing Jiang Zemin’s great deeds
“Opening Up the West” can hardly be described as a policy in the narrow
sense of a properly delineated action plan formulated and implemented by
clearly defined actors, envisaging a complete and consistent set of goals
and measures. Rather, it appears as a highly diffuse decision-making
59. Li Cheng, “A landslide victory for provincial leaders,” China Leadership Monitor, No.
5 (Winter 2003), www.chinaleadershipmonitor.org/20031/lc.pdf, Table 4.
60. Ibid. p. 6; Heike Holbig, “Erste Medienauftritte der neuen Fu¨hrungsspitze — Hu Jintao
und Zeng Qinghong,” China aktuell, December 2002, pp. 1378–80.
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process shaped by dynamic interactions between numerous actors at
central, provincial and local levels over almost two decades, causing
priorities to shift and policy goals and instruments to proliferate. The
outcome of this process may more adequately be described as a “soft”
policy: a fragmented cluster of diverse agendas, sometimes competing,
but not necessarily contradictory as they appeal to different actors and are
promoted in parallel. At least five separate agendas can be identified:
• Quest for equality. The promise of reducing regional income disparities
and social inequalities appeals to the leaders of the interior who, since
the 1980s, have felt increasingly disadvantaged by Deng Xiaoping’s
reform policy. Also, it seems palatable to those decision-makers in the
central party-state committed to socialist principles, be they conserva-
tive Maoists, representatives of the “new left” or proponents of a more
social democratic orientation.61
• Foreign investment. With the country’s WTO accession becoming
more tangible in the late 1990s, the expectation of attracting invest-
ments from abroad, too, had a strong appeal to the interior regions, but
also to the more liberal forces in the centre who hoped that a unified
national market would benefit the whole Chinese economy.
• Infrastructure investment. The mechanistic vision of economic and
social integration of the country’s vast hinterland into a highly devel-
oped PRC by binding them into a network of large-scale infrastructure
projects not only promises the possibility of large inflows of state
investment to the interior provinces but also appeals to the descendants
of economic planners in the SDPC. As the administrative agency
formulating and implementing the Open Up the West policy since late
1999, the SDPC – and its sub-organizations at the provincial and local
level – has had a strong influence on its realization.
• Tackling the nationalities issue. The various special policies for min-
ority nationality areas comprised in the Open Up the West programme
reflect a long-standing hope to assimilate and integrate the ethnic
minorities at the western periphery better into the PRC and thus to
counter any socio-economic and military threats they present – a hope
that might be shared by proponents of the “new left” and by more
authoritarian or nationalistic strategists at the centre. At the same time,
the issue of minority nationality areas has been accentuated as a
bargaining tactic in the process of regional demarcation since the
official inauguration of the new policy, allowing the inclusion of some
provincial-level jurisdictions (and autonomous prefectures) and the
exclusion of others.
• Sustainable development. A similar logic might be behind the environ-
mental agenda of the Open Up the West policy. While there is indeed
a growing concern about accelerated ecological degradation in the
country’s hinterland that might affect the whole nation’s economic
61. For an illuminating analysis of the various discourses comprised in the Open Up the
West policy see David S. G. Goodman, “The politics of the west. Equality, nation-building
and colonisation,” Provincial China, Vol.7, No.2 (October 2002), p. 127.
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growth, this agenda seems to have been emphasized more recently as
another bargaining tactic in the regional demarcation process. Prelimi-
nary evidence is that at least some of the campaign-style “ecological
construction” measures are inadequate if not inappropriate for the
ecological needs of the region.
Because of the amorphous and dynamic nature of this soft policy, the
future prospects of the campaign to Open Up the West are very difficult
to assess. Seen from the perspective of the provincial-level jurisdictions
involved, the campaign appears as a highly attractive forum for the
negotiation of expectations and real benefits, offering many incentives to
continue it for as long as possible. Of course, benefits accruing from the
policy are not the same for all but depend on the influence particular
actors have on its formulation and implementation. On the whole, it can
be assumed that the leverage of single provincial-level jurisdictions in the
policy-making process varies with their size and economic weight, with
their strategic position in terms of national security and unity, and with
the effectiveness of personal networks and lobbying groups. Here there is
a need for more detailed understanding of specific actors and compe-
tences at (inter)provincial and local levels, of flows of information,
bargaining mechanisms and of formal and informal lobbying efforts. All
the same, it seems quite clear that the realization of the Open Up the West
policy currently depends to a great extent on the specific interpretations
and arrangements of the provincial-level jurisdictions involved.
From the perspective of the central party-state, the policy presents an
opportunity as well as a liability. Particularly for the new leadership
under Hu Jintao, it offers a welcome chance not only to broaden its
regional power base, but also to bolster its legitimacy. Understood as
large-scale political campaign transcending the specific projects outlined
in the Tenth Five-year Plan and other documents, the campaign to Open
Up the West implies attractive discourses of a responsible central govern-
ment, of social and economic equality and of national integration and
modernization. While the ideational dimension of the campaign has to be
left for further research, anecdotal evidence suggests that central leaders
have indeed capitalized on these positive images to enhance their political
posture.
The other side of the coin is the enormous financial liabilities that
might come with the realization of the large-scale campaign. As already
suggested, not being too specific about the central funds earmarked for
the new policy might be a tactical device of the central government to
avoid stirring up too many expectations among “entitled” regions. How-
ever, the campaign will only be viable in the longer term with sustained
financial flows into the hinterland. While optimistic economists might
predict that after an initial phase of substantive state investment, regional
development in the western periphery will reach a take-off phase with
strengthened self-funding capacities and increasing foreign investments,
these sources seem quite limited for the foreseeable future. More realisti-
cally, the central government will pay the largest part of the bill, whether
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through continued fiscal transfers (which might provoke other provinces’
resentment) or through policy loans by state banks (which would proba-
bly mean bailing them out at some point). In the face of a growing
budgetary deficit and the perceived risk of a financial crisis looming over
China, these options will not be so easily affordable in the years to come.
Under hardening budget constraints, sustaining this ambitious soft policy
could become increasingly difficult.
